How to hire voluntary helpers? We shed new light on this question by reporting a field experiment in which we invited 2,859 students to help at the 'ESA Europe 2012' conference. Invitation emails varied non-monetary and monetary incentives to convince subjects to offer help. Students could apply to help at the conference and, if so, also specify the working time they want to offer. Just asking subjects to volunteer or offering them a certificate turned out to be significantly more motivating than mentioning that the regular conference fee would be waived for helpers. Increasing monetary incentives by varying hourly wages of 1, 5, and 10 Euros shows positive effects on the number of applications and on the working time offered. However, when comparing these results with treatments without any monetary compensation, the number of applications could not be increased by offering money and may even be reduced.
Introduction
How to motivate voluntary helpers? As shown by Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) the standard economic view would suggest to provide financial incentives. Frey and Götte (1999) , however, have observed that monetary incentives can well undermine motivation: external financial rewards may backfire as extrinsic incentives could crowd out the intrinsic motives to socially engage (see also Tirole, 2006, 2003) . Crowding-out effects are known from different fields of social engagement. Titmuss (1970) , for example, argued that monetary compensation for donating blood might crowd out the supply of blood donors (see also Mellström and Johannesson, 2008) . Lacetera et al. (2012) , however, have shown that extrinsic financial incentives can also stimulate pro-social behavior, e.g., to donate blood. Thus, the evidence on the crowding effects of financial incentives on pro-social behavior is still inconclusive (see Gneezy et al., 2011 for a critical review).
But there is also some evidence that different forms of non-monetary incentives can motivate individuals. If an action is pro-social per se, individuals may feel motivated by the action itself as they are doing 'good' as shown by Andreoni (1998) . Based on the formal analysis of Bénabou and Tirole (2006) , Ariely et al. (2009) have shown experimentally that this effect increases if the pro-social activity is observed by others, i.e., people receive social recognition for their actions improving their social-and self-image (see also Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) . In a similar vein, Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) presented evidence that non-monetary awards can have a strong motivating effect. As pointed out by Clary et al. (1998) , another non-monetary source of motivation are opportunities of personal and professional development, i.e., individuals gain career-related benefits from voluntary work, like learning new skills, being enabled to signal personality traits or improving their personal or business networks (see also Holmström, 1999) .
To shed more light on the effects of non-monetary and monetary rewards on the willingness to help, we ran a field experiment when organizing the 'ESA Europe 2012' conference hosted by the University of Cologne.
1 We recruited helpers to provide technical assistance in each of the presentation rooms of the different parallel sessions. To advertise our search for helpers we sent out 2,859 emails to a pool of business and economics students enrolled at the University of Cologne. In the email we varied the types of incentives provided.
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In one set of treatments we used three types of incentives that did not involve money. In our baseline treatment we tried to motivate candidates to volunteer by just mentioning that they would have the benefit to attend the conference during the time they would not work for us. In a second treatment we additionally offered an appreciatory certificate for their service.
3 In a third treatment we provided information about the exact amount of the regular conference fee, which would be waived for the helpers.
In another set of treatments we provided very small, medium and higher hourly wages to motivate possible candidates, i.e., we offered either 1 Euro, 5
Euros and 10 Euros as hourly wage.
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Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the six treatment groups. Departing from other insightful studies on volunteer work supply that mainly exploit survey data (Frey and Götte, 1999) or lab experiments (Linardi and McConnell, 2011 ) and in line with Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) We find that participants reacted differently to the different types of nonmonetary incentives. Just asking them to volunteer or offering them an additional certificate was significantly more motivating than mentioning that regular attendees would have to pay an expensive registration fee to get access to the conference. One explanation might be that potential helpers were de-motivated as they felt exploited when becoming aware that a substantial budget was available from the conference fee.
Once money was offered, participants were also sensitive to increasing monetary incentives but only when these incentives were sufficiently strong. While we find no significant differences in the reactions to the 1 Euro or 5 Euros hourly wage, both the number of applications and the working time offered significantly increased when the promised hourly wage was 10 Euros instead of 1 or 5 Euros.
Hence, paying more money may actually help to attract helpers, but only when the wage level exceeds the opportunity costs of work.
Comparing the non-monetary with the monetary incentives we find no significant effects on both margins between just asking for pure voluntary help compared to offering the 1 Euro or 5 Euros hourly wage. We also do not find significant effects on the extensive margin (i.e., the fraction of applicants) between simply asking for help compared to the 10 Euros treatment. However, there is a significant difference on the intensive margin between these two treatments, i.e., offering a 10 Euros hourly wage significantly increased the working time offered.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the experimental setup and our six treatments. In section 3 we analyze the data. Section 4 discusses and concludes the paper.
Experimental Setup
We manipulated the emails that were sent out by the organizing committee of the ESA European Conference in Cologne in order to recruit helpers for the conference. A mailing contained basic information about the dates, topic, and content of the conference. Students who were interested in helping at the conference were instructed to click on a link to a web page where they were asked to provide some basic information (contact information, demographics) and their availability during the week of the conference. Each day of the conference week was split up into three working shifts of four hours each. Participants who applied had to indicate how many working shifts they would be willing to take.
In our baseline treatment Voluntary only the text mentioned above was included in the email. In the other experimental treatments we added one additional sentence that contained the information about the respective incentives.
In a first set of treatments we tested the influence of non-monetary incentives on the probability to apply and the willingness to provide working time. In the treatment Certificate helpers were told that they would receive a formal certificate at the end of the conference in order to appreciate their help. Additionally, we had a treatment Waived Fee in which we highlighted that the regular conference For the exact wording of the invitations see Table 1 , for the complete texts of the invitation see appendix. Recipients were business and economics students from the study programs of the Faculty of Management, Economics and Social
Sciences at the University of Cologne (48% female). A total of 2,859 emails were sent out two month before the conference. 
Results
In the following section we first present the results from our treatments without monetary incentives and then focus on the treatments with monetary incentives.
In Figure 1 we display the descriptive statistics of our two variables of interest.
The relative frequencies of applications per treatment are displayed in the upper panels (gray bars) while the mean minutes of work offered are shown below (black bars).
6 Although we provided monetary incentives in these treatments we kept the wording of the emails constant, i.e., we maintained to use the word volunteer albeit we would pay helpers in the monetary incentive treatments.
7 Before the first mailing the authors committed to recruit applicants from the treatment with the highest number of applications. The first mailing was sent out on July 6th, followed by two reminders containing the same information on July 26th and August 2nd. 
Non-Monetary Incentives
We start by analyzing the number and frequencies of applications under the different non-monetary treatments. 8 We treat every subject to whom we sent an email but who did not apply as a subject offering zero minutes of work.
9 For all specification reported in this paper we also ran Probit or Tobit regression respec- 
Monetary Incentives
Turning to the impact of monetary incentives we can establish the following observation: The OLS regressions reported in Table 3 (Model 1) complement our nonparametric findings. Reference group is the 10 Euros treatment as it led to the highest number of applications and the highest number of minutes of work time tively with very similar results.
offered. Reducing the wage rate from 10 Euros to either 1 Euro or 5 Euros leads to a reduction of the application probability by roughly 50%. However, it also becomes clear that while the number of applicants is somewhat smaller in the Voluntary treatment without any compensation there is no significant difference to this treatment. Hence, paying a substantial hourly wage did not lead to an increase in the number of applicants relative to the announcement of a purely voluntary activity.
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Again there is an increasing number of working minutes offered across the monetary treatments p=.0048, Given that money is offered the minutes supplied vary nearly linearly in the wage rate (the minutes supplied are only significantly different between the 1 Euro and 10 Euros condition). 
Conclusion
Our results confirm and extend previous findings on how to motivate volunteers.
First of all, once money is offered, labor supply in terms of the number of applicants and the offered minutes is increasing in the hourly wage offered which is well in line with purely neoclassical considerations. However, when comparing the results with a treatment without any monetary compensation, the number of applications could not be increased by offering money and may even be reduced.
Though, once the payment offered exceeds the reservation wage, it also leads to an overall labor supply that is larger. A direct implication of this result is that if the pool of potential volunteers is sufficiently large and it suffices that each volunteer provides a smaller number of working time not offering money may be preferable even in the absence of budget constraints. However, when the applicant pool is not large enough paying wages above the reservation wage still helps to increase the overall labor supply.
But the most striking result is that mentioning the waived conference fees induces a substantial demotivating effect. This negative effect may be explained by the potential helpers' perception that the conference fee leads to a substantial budget which is spent on other issues. Apparently, becoming aware that a substantial budget is available potential volunteers may feel exploited when being offered no compensation. Potentially, the clarification for the use of funds may overcome this danger. Whether and to what extent this is the case should be an interesting topic for future research.
11 There are several interpretations for such crowding-out effects based on formal economic models. An interpretation of this result in the light of Bénabou and Tirole (2006) is that weak monetary incentives reduce the signaling value of an application to demonstrate pro-social preferences. An interpretation in the spirit of Sliwka (2007) is that offering weak monetary incentives may reveal that volunteering without any monetary compensation is not the norm of behavior (hence, money is has to be offered to attract applications). At the same time the hourly wage is too small to attract applications that are driven by purely pecuniary motives.
